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Point
Nowadays, we may often observe a certain 
anxiety in the articles of most native social-
political sphere researchers, the anxiety, which 
concerns «the rolling back» of the Russian 
democracy by means of the executive power 
over-accretion in comparison to the constituent 
and judicial powers [1], and, besides, this 
process is connected with the increase of the 
Russian parliament institutional weakness 
[2]. On the basis of the analysis of the federal 
status dynamics, of the place and the role of 
various parties in the real politics, and changes 
in the electoral system, the scientists come 
to conclusions of a possibility of a significant 
intensiveness already in the nearest future 
[3]. On the whole, these fears are not baseless; 
moreover, one of them is a violation of the 
principle of powers separation. 
Example
In science and political practice, the 
given principle is considered to be one of the 
fundamentals of democratic society governance – 
it is an axiom. Though, we should bear in mind 
that in Lenin’s interpretation this principle was 
presented as a method of deception of «the working 
masses», as far as it was allegedly nothing else 
but «a separation of the administrative labour», 
which veiled the exploitative essence of the 
bourgeois federal status. And it is not excluded 
that the lack of attention, having been paid to 
the principle of powers separation in the native 
social philosophy and political science, and, 
moreover, in the practice of state administration 
of the society, is to some extend determined by 
the traditional mentality as of theoreticians, so 
of practitioners. Of course, the citizens, for the 
most their part, are as well not ready to percept 
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adequately the democratic governance, as far 
as authoritarianism of their conscious has been 
formed by the centuries of the empire and most 
efficiently by the decades of the Soviet power and 
it cannot be radically changed in the course of 
two decades.
The main purpose of the principle of powers 
separation is in the following: to exclude the 
dominating position of one of three government 
departments (in most cases – the executive one), 
as far as it inevitably leads to dictatorship in this 
or that form, and consequently, to denial of rights 
and freedoms of the person. In the Constitution of 
Russia there is a formal mechanism, appealed to 
avoid possible conflicts between the constituent 
and executive powers, to exclude the situation of 
the executive power absolute domineering (for 
example, President’s appointment of the Chairman 
of the Government only with the sanction of the 
State Duma, a possibility of motion of the vote 
of censure to the Government by the lower house 
of parliament), but, unfortunately, such a system 
of checks and balances does not prevent the 
executive power over-accretion.
The Constitution of Russia declares 
the principle of powers separation as one of 
the fundamentals of the country democratic 
development (art.10). But the Constitution itself 
fixes the conditions, under which the given 
principle cannot fail to be violated. First of all, it 
is a position of the Government within the system 
of powers separation: in practice, it absolutely 
depends on the Head of the State – in the process 
of formation, functioning and resignation. Of 
course, the Chairman of the Government is 
assigned by the President only with the sanction 
of the State Duma, but it is a purely formal 
fragment of the system of checks and balances, 
as far as if the State Duma thrice refuses to give 
such a sanction, then it is dissolved by the Head 
of the State – there is no any other alternative. 
Consequently, if he wishes so much, the President 
always can achieve an assignment of the person, 
he needs, for the post of the Chairman of the 
Government, though dissolution of the lower 
house of parliament is a serious political crisis 
for the whole country. Further, on the basis of 
constitutional norms, the State Duma seems to be 
able to control the superior body of the executive 
power (in order it could not draw «the blanket of 
power» over it too much) by means of censure 
vote motion. But it is also nothing more, than a 
formality, as far as if the Government is defeated 
for the second time in the course of three months, 
then it makes the President chose: whether 
resignation of the Government, or dissolution 
of the Duma. Deputies always understand quite 
well, that the Head of the State has no reason to 
dismiss the Government, which has been formed 
by him and which is fully subordinated to him. 
Possibly, precisely, in the force of «the instinct 
of self-protection», the State Duma defeated the 
Government (in 1995) and declared the vote of 
censure only once for the whole history of the 
new Russian federal status, but it looked more 
like a farce, as far as it did not take the risk to 
repeat it in three months, in order not to give the 
President any lawful bases for dissolving it.
So, in practice the lower house of parliament 
turns out to be unable to control the supreme 
body of the executive power and the upper 
house of parliament – neither. The matter is that 
the Federation Council is formed with a gross 
violation of the principle of powers separation, 
which presupposes a distinct differentiation of 
government departments according to the means 
of formation, structure and functions, not allowing 
«mixing» of powers in one and the same organs. 
Though, in our country half the members of the 
upper house of parliament are representatives of 
the executive power of the Federation subjects, 
having been assigned personally by the leaders 
of the executive power supreme bodies of 
regions, districts, and republics. But, these chief 
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executive officers of the subjects of Federation 
are personally suggested by the President and 
are always assigned without a hitch by regional 
parliaments.
Actually, from the part of the President it 
is a control over the Federation Council with a 
help of the instrument of governors assignment, 
but it is precisely what makes the function of 
constitutionalization control of the Federation 
Council senseless.
Right on the basis of the mentioned comments 
we can come to a conclusion of institutional 
weakness of the Russian parliament, which is not 
able to play its role in the system of democratic 
state powers separation, and consequently, it is 
quite in order to raise the question of our federal 
status democraticity on the whole.
The attitude to the principle of powers 
separation in the state management practice 
can be seen on the example of dynamics of the 
native federalism. The RF Constitution declares 
the authority of Federation (art.77). In the world 
science and practice, federalism is perceived as a 
variety of parts within the frames of the integral, 
defining separate common features. First of all, 
this variety concerns the ways of regulation of 
the inner organization subjects. These subjects 
must be free in their choice of a most suitable 
model of inner power-management structure (of 
course, this freedom is limited by the interests of 
the federal integrity). Federalism presupposes a 
significant heterogeneity of constitutional models 
of the Federation subjects. This heterogeneity 
contributes to a maximal adaptation of regional 
power structures to specific conditions of concrete 
subjects, and such kind of pluralism optimizes 
a healthy competition among the Federation 
subjects, and it stimulates all-round development 
as of the regions, so of the federal integrity. 
Precisely, such an understanding of federalism 
gives positive practical results to the peoples of 
Germany, USA, Canada and others.
In modern Russia, population of the 
Federation subjects does not elect the governors 
(the presidents of republics), and it is already a 
violation of constitutional rights of the citizens 
and the Federation subjects’ status. According to 
the latest legislation, the President of RF proposes 
a candidacy for the post of the governor to the 
parliament of a corresponding Federation subject. 
Outwardly, deputies of the regional parliament 
are free in their choice of voting «for» and 
«against», but having thrice rejected the proposed 
candidacies, the «stubborn» regional parliament 
is dissolved by the President. Moreover, the head 
of the state has a right to remove the governor 
from his post by reason of «the loss of confidence» 
(and the interpretation of this reason can be rather 
wide).
The right of the President to dissolve regional 
parliaments, before their term is over, is similar 
to his right to dissolve the State Duma, after it 
has thrice defeated a candidacy for the post of 
prime-minister, proposed by the head of the state 
(art.111 the RF Constitution). But, dissolution of 
the regional parliaments is provided neither by 
the letter, nor by the spirit of the Constitution.
In practice, up to this day, all the candidacies 
for the post of region heads, having been proposed 
by the President, were «elected» by the regional 
parliaments, thereat, by the majority of deputies’ 
voices. Today’s situation is formally characterized 
by the fact that the head of the state does not 
appoint the heads of Federation subjects, but only 
proposes candidacies, while local parliaments 
elect them. In fact, taking into account possible 
sanctions, the heads of the regions are appointed 
by the President, and regional parliaments are 
dependent on the President. Right here, we can 
observe the Russian approach to the principle of 
powers separation.
General conception analysis of our 
federalism, as it has been perceived in the 
Constitution, and later on detailed and realized 
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in to life, proves that: after the legislative reforms 
have been done, the influence of the Centre (first 
of all, of the President) on the regions has become 
so strong, that there has been left very little of our 
federalism.
A detailed research of the Russian presidential 
powers brings to the conclusion that in this 
country the regime of the personal power of the 
head of the state has been built and is constantly 
strengthened. Some researchers consider it to be a 
normal process in the light of historical, political 
and cultural traditions of our nation (the necessity 
of «a strong hand», «a host»), but political history 
knows one more «tradition»: an extreme personal 
power usually becomes a dictatorship. That is 
why democratic regime is in so much need of the 
principle of powers separation, in order to create 
quite strict institutional limitations, being able to 
check as «the will to power», so «the traditional 
mentality»
According to the letter of the Constitution, 
President of Russia is the head of the state, 
and consequently, he enters neither of the 
government departments, as far as he himself 
forms the Government and exercises general 
leadership of its activity. In fact, today the 
executive power supreme body is the apparatus 
of the head of the state. In reality, the President 
may repeal any enactment of the Government 
not only by reason of its inconformity with the 
law, but with the presidential decree as well; the 
President approves the structure of the executive 
power supreme bodies; appoints the members 
of the Government and forces them to resign. 
That is why article 10 of the Constitution looks 
like a typical formality, the article, which has 
announced the principle of powers separation: 
«The organs of the constituent, executive and 
judicial powers are independent».
So, this brings up a natural question: should 
we explain a constant accretion of the executive 
power (= presidential power) only by the drawbacks 
of the constitutional regulation? We suppose that 
all the politics of the ruling elite of the country is 
aimed for it. Its result is an institutional weakness 
of the parliament, «the pocket government», 
absence of an independent judicial power, as far 
as the judges of all three of the supreme courts 
of the country – the Constitutional, Supreme 
and Supreme Arbitration Courts are appointed 
by the upper house of parliament according to 
the proposal of the President, while a half of the 
upper house of parliament consists of «the people 
of the President».
We also consider the latest reforms of the 
election legislation to be rather dangerous for 
the democratic future of the country. First of all, 
we should note that these reforms demonstrate a 
vivid tendency to mono-party membership (while 
formally we preserve our multi-party system). It 
is the rising of the lower-house-of-the-parliament 
parties’ passing barrier from five to seven percent. 
In December, 2007, the State Duma Elections 
proved the efficiency of this measure for the 
ruling elite: «the ruling party» is unrivaled, the 
communist party has relatively a few places and 
is not dangerous for the regime, because it is 
not so popular among younger generations and 
people of the middle age, the Liberal Democratic 
Party has also few places, besides it is highly 
adaptive and, as a last resort, it can be just 
fictitious-oppositional, and the youngest party is 
a «pocket» one from the very beginning. Thereat, 
the most oppositional parties have turned out to 
be «outboard». 
Besides, the cancellation of the State 
Duma’s half the membership election according 
to the majoritarian electoral system is also 
rather illustrative – today, elections go on only 
according to the party lists. It gives a possibility 
to get rid of so-called independent deputies 
in the lower house of parliament, who can be 
uncontrolled and can form an opposition to the 
power. But, this is not the end of the story. Even 
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the deputies, having been elected on the majority-
proportional basis (party lists), lose the remnants 
of their deputative independence, as far as the law 
introduces elements of «the imperative mandate», 
i.e. having deserted his party faction, the deputy 
automatically loses his deputy mandate of the 
lower house of parliament.
Such measures as, prohibition of regional 
and interregional parties, and also of party blocs 
(which, we should underline, are a common 
phenomena abroad), set one thinking. Blocs 
are obviously very dangerous for the powers: 
they can become too popular among people and 
form an opposition to the powers or become 
«the ruling party» competitors. We should also 
underline the fact, that the modern election 
legislation presupposes more than forty reasons 
for registration rejection or striking off separate 
candidates and party lists.
Resume
Let’s repeat: the principle of power 
separation is one of the fundamentals of the 
democratic political regime. But, according to 
K. Popper, democracy inevitably presupposes 
bloodless change of government in the result 
of free election. There, where such a change is 
impossible, there is no democracy. We would 
find difficulty to quarrel with this statement. But, 
«bloodless change of government» presupposes a 
free competition between political elites (parties), 
and a real dependence of the parties, having won 
in the elections, upon the electorate: they will 
not be re-elected, if they are not able to govern 
the county efficiently, and, as a consequence, 
the citizens will stop trusting them. But, it is 
impossible to speak about free competition 
in the conditions of real and legally provided 
domineering of one of the parties. And likewise, 
it is impossible to speak about democratization of 
the state governance in the conditions of so strong 
accretion of the executive power at the expense of 
constituent and judicial powers.
Having so highly-illustrative lessons of 
our history before us, we, the Russians, should 
understand better than others, that violation of 
the principle of powers separation, an excessive 
concentration of power in one centre can result 
in «the rollback» of the forming civil-society 
elements, in the total violation of the citizens’ 
rights, i.e. in a complete destruction of the existing 
elements of the modern democracy.
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